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UTILIZING STATISTICS AND BELLWETHER TRIALS
IN MASS TORTS: WHAT DO THE CONSTITUTION AND
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PERMIT?
Traditional judicial mechanisms that preserve litigants' rights to due process
and a jury trial challenge courts to provide litigants their day in court in an
efficient and timely manner. This challenge is made exponentially harder where the
litigation concerns tortious conduct affecting a large number ofpersons and giving
rise to latent injury. In response to the recent increase in mass tort filings, courts
have sought an alternative means of adjudication-the extrapolation of a
statistically average, representative plaintiffto other plaintiffs. This Note examines
the problems associated with mass tort actions and how two circuit courts of
appeals have implemented the use ofstatistically representative bellwether plaint iffs
in resolving mass tort issues. After comparing the use of bellwether plaintiffs to
traditional mass tort mechanisms in questioning whether statistical representation
violates due process and the right to a jury trial, the Note concludes with a
proposition for the proper role that the use of extrapolating statistics to non-
bellwether plaintiffs should take in mass tort litigation.
Every decade presents a few great cases that force the judicial system to
choose between forging a solution to a major social problem on the one
hand, and preserving its institutional values on the other.'
INTRODUCTION
"It is a fundamental principle of American law that every person is entitled to his
or her day in court."2 The filing of a mass tort action can threaten to overwhelm a
court's ability to actually provide litigants with their "day in court."3 Recognizing
the importance not only of guaranteeing a litigant's day in court, but also of having
that day come in an efficient and expeditious manner,4 a number of mechanisms exist
to afford judges wide latitude to efficiently handle a large number of claims at one
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), aft'd, 521 U.S.
591 (1997).
2 Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S.Ct. 2395 (1999).
See infra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Levin, 792 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D. Md. 1992)
(denying a preliminary injunction to stop a Maryland state court judge's trial plan in an
asbestos case, in part because the federal court recognized the importance of trying the cases
in an efficient manner and that justice delayed would be justice denied).
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time. Each of these mechanisms-for example, class actions, consolidation, multi-
district litigation transfers, and collateral estoppel-preserve litigants' constitutional
rights to due process and to ajury trial.5 The increase in mass tort litigation filings
challenges the ability of traditional mechanisms to resolve cases efficiently.6
Acknowledging the burdens that mass tort litigation impose on a court, two United
States Courts of Appeals have approved the use of the extrapolation of results from
statistically representative "bellwether" plaintiffs to other "non-test" or "non-
bellwether" plaintiffs.7
In implementing this method, the Ninth Circuit recognized, although ultimately
ignored, that this approach implicated and potentially violated due process rights.!
While the widespread use of statistical sampling may improve the efficiency of
managing a mass tort action, the question remains whether such a procedure
adequately protects non-bellwether plaintiffs' and defendants' rights to due process
and to ajury trial when a court mandates such a procedure. The constitutionality of
such a procedure is particularly questionable because courts have denied class action
certification on grounds that the issues are too individualistic to be resolved on a
class-wide basis.9
Part I of this Note will examine the nature of the problem by defining a mass tort,
explaining the difficulties that courts confront in dealing with a mass tort action, and
examining how the traditional utilization of class actions, consolidation, and
bellwether plaintiffs emerged as a partial response to these problems. In Part II, this
Note will examine the proposed solutions to this problem as suggested and
implemented by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. Part III will analyze whether these
proposals violate due process and the right to a jury trial in the context of the
traditional methods used to improvejudicial efficiency-class actions and collateral
estoppel. Part IV will suggest the correct role that statistical sampling can and should
play in mass tort litigation.
' See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,423 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protect the right to a jury trial); Panther Pumps
& Equip. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 566 F.2d 8, 17 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure were designed to comport with the requirements of due process).
6 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION, 127 (1995)
(arguing that mass tort cases have outstripped the ability of the common law to fashion
remedies that adequately address these harms); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S.
Ct. 2295, 2315 (1999) (noting the "inherent tension" between representative suits and the
"day in court" ideal).
7 See infra notes 105-47 and accompanying text.
See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 785 (9th Cir. 1996).
See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (6th Cir.
1988) (explaining that the "problem of individualization is often cited as justification for
denying class action treatment in mass tort[s]").
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I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. What is a Mass Tort?
The term "mass torts" refers to tortious conduct affecting a large number of
persons and giving rise to latent injury.' A mass tort is distinguishable from a mass
accident in that a mass accident concerns a single event that causes a uniform injury
to a large number of people.l" The crucial difference between a mass accident and
a mass tort is the nature of injury. Whereas those injured in a mass accident suffer
injuries as a result of one uniform cause, plaintiffs in a mass tort suffer a variety of
injuries over a long period of time and the causation of such injuries must be
evaluated in light of individual aspects of the person. 2
The best example of a mass accident is an airplane crash. A large number of
people are injured or killed as the result of a single cause-the crash of the airplane.
In an airplane crash, causation can be proved on a group basis because the cause of
the injury is common to each of the plaintiffs. 3
A prime example of a mass tort action is the asbestos litigation. In contrast to
the mass accident, injury occurs as a result of exposure over a long period of time. 4
The exposure results in different diseases and outcomes. 5 Indeed, not all persons
exposed contract illnesses nor does the exposure always produce unique or
identifiable injuries. 6 Thus, the relation between the event and the injury is far less
certain and more dependant upon factors related to differences between individuals. 7
Crucial distinctions exist between a mass accident and a mass tort. In a mass
tort, no single accident occurs to cause similar types of harm nor does a single set of
operative facts establish liability. 8 Most importantly, no single proximate cause
1o See Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO.
L.J. 295, 296 n.l (1996). In defining "mass torts," Nagareda requires that plaintiffs be
geographically disbursed and distinguishes mass tort plaintiffs from toxic tort plaintiffs.
See id. Such a distinction is unnecessary here.
See id.
12 See In re Northern Dist. of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Prods, Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 852-53 (9th Cir. 1982).
"3 See id at 853. Even in airplane crashes, some courts have declined to adjudicate such
cases as class actions. See, e.g., McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent.
Dist. of Fl., 523 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975); Causey v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,
66 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Va. 1975).
14 See Nagareda, supra note 10, at 296.
"5 See Malcolm v. National Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1993) (observing
the variety of ailments caused by asbestos); infra note 156.
16 See Malcolm, 995 F.2d at 351.
'7 See 3 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 17.06 (3d ed. 1992).
'8 See Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 84-85 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
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applies equally to each potential injured person.' 9 In a mass tort case, such as an
environmental exposure case or a products liability case, the plaintiffs typically do
not have the same intensity, duration, and type of exposure, nor uniformity of disease
or injury."0 In short, mass tort plaintiffs are exposed to a substance for different
amounts of time, in different ways, and over different periods.2 These differences
affect the problem of proving individual causation, making traditional representative
treatment and efficient adjudication of these claims difficult, if not impossible.
B. The Problems of a Mass Tort Action
Filing a mass tort complaint, a consolidation or a multi-district transfer has the
potential of overwhelming the resources of a particular court.22 The best overview
of the problems encountered by courts in dealing with mass torts such as asbestos
was summarized by the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Amchem
Products v. Windsor,3 relying in large part on the 1990 Report by the United States
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation. The Report's
description of the asbestos problems illuminates potential problems typical to large
mass tort litigation:24
The most objectionable aspects of asbestos litigation can be briefly
summarized: dockets in both federal and state courts continue to grow;
long delays are.routine; trials are too long; the same issues are litigated
over and over; transaction costs exceed the victims' recovery by nearly
'9 See In re Northern Dist. of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 1982).
20 See Richard 0. Faulk et al., Building A Better Mousetrap? A New Approach to Trying
Mass Tort Cases, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 779, 802 (1998).
2 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 626-28 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd, 521
U.S. 591 (1997); see also In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1084 (6th Cir.
1996) (stating that absent a single happening or accident, the factual and legal issues of
causation differ dramatically from individual to individual).
22 See Michael Higgins, Mass Tort Makeover?, 84 A.B.A. J. 53, 56-57 (Nov. 1998)
(discussing reforms for mass tort litigation in the wake of the class action lawsuits over
silicone breast implants).
23 521 U.S. 591 (1997). The Court briefly reiterated and relied on its articulation in
Windsor when it decided Ortiz v. Fibreboard. See 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2302 (1999).
24 See Alvin B. Rubin, Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REv. 429, 429.
(1986) ("These mass tort claims have a number of similarities: they result in the filing of
many suits; they produce high litigation costs; they are generally resolved only after great
delay; they affect not only the litigants but other users of the court system; and their total
human and economic costs affect all of society.").
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two to one; exhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and
future claimants may lose altogether.25
The Ad Hoc Committee estimated that between thirteen and twenty-one million
workers had been exposed to asbestos in the workplace.26 This exposure led to
several hundred thousand lawsuits." The claimants who suffered the most serious
injuries frequently received the least compensation.28 During the 1980s, the asbestos
lawsuits comprised more than six percent of all federal filings and were subject to
delay that was twice that of other civil suits.29 The resulting transaction costs
associated with asbestos litigation leave asbestos victims only thirty-nine cents of
every asbestos dollar paid."0 The asbestos litigation produced the real and present
danger that transaction costs would exhaust available assets before plaintiffs could
collect forjudgments, if obtained.3 There is a real concern that many plaintiffs will
die before they are compensated and a great many will wait years for their awards. 2
At least onejudge has expressed the concern that trying "virtually identical lawsuits,
one-by-one, will bankrupt both the state and federal court systems. 33
The situation concerning asbestos is not unique. Litigation involving breast
implants and Dalkon Shield faced similar delays, bankruptcies, and high transaction
costs.3 4 In the implant litigation, experts estimate that, for every dollar plaintiffs
recover, litigation expenses will consume another sixty to seventy-five cents.35 Like
the asbestos litigation defendants, the breast implant manufacturers faced thousands
25 1990 REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMMTTEE
ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 3 (Mar. 1991) [hereinafter ASBESTOS LITIGATION REPORT].
26 See id at 6-7.
27 See Windsor, 521 U.S. at 631 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting).
28 See id
29 See ASBESTOS LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 25, at 10-11.
30 See Windsor, 521 U.S. at 632 (Breyer, J., concurring and dissenting); see also Ortiz
v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2324 (1999) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting the
high transaction costs of asbestos cases).
31 See ASBESTOS LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 25, at 2, 34-35.
32 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 141.
"' Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323,
324 (1983). Plaintiffs' attorneys likewise have acknowledged that, at least during the
1980s, the courts had "difficulty handling the caseload or providing adequate and timely
compensation for victims." Kristin Loiacono, Asbestos Litigation is Up in the Air Again,
35-SEP TRIAL 11 (1999) (quoting American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) President
Richard Middleton).
14 See Higgins, supra note 22, at 53; ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE
WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 24-25 (1999)
(discussing the breast implant litigation) [hereinafter REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION];
see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 712-15 (4th Cir. 1989) (discussing plaintiffs'
efforts to minimize delays).
'5 See Higgins, supra note 22, at 53.
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of cases and the possibility of trials that could last for months.36 As a result of mass
tort litigation, the manufacturer of Dalkon Shield, A.H. Robbins, and at least one
implant maker, Dow Coming, filed for bankruptcy.37
The courts continue to be confronted with a "rising tide of mass tort filings."3
As Judge Anthony Scirica correctly observed, "It's asbestos. It's breast implants.
It's fen-phen [diet drugs] ." Although the Fifth Circuit declined to certify "what may
be the largest class action ever attempted in federal court,"4 contending that class
certification of all nicotine-dependent smokers would be tantamount to "judicial
blackmail,"'" the plaintiffs' lawyers who brought the private tobacco case have
instead begun filing claims in state courts.42 These cases include classes as large as
one million people.43 While some of these cases have been certified as class actions,
the highly individualistic questions of addiction and causation would still have to be
resolved on an individual basis.44 Thus, the mere resolution ofthe issues certified for
class action treatment will not fully resolve these cases.
If the asbestos litigation is a prediction of the future of mass tort actions,
Congress cannot be counted on to respond to any particular litigation crisis. Calls for
congressional action to deal with the asbestos litigation problems emerged as early
as 1985."5 In 1990, the Ad Hoc Committee recommended that Congress create a
36 See id.
"7 See In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 574-76 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997);
WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 137.
38 Higgins, supra note 22, at 53 (quoting Judge Anthony Scirica); see also Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2302 (1999) (noting the "elephantine mass of asbestos
cases").
3' Higgins, supra note 22, at 53 (quoting Judge Anthony Scirica); see also REPORT ON
MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 34, at 9 (explaining that "[miass tort litigation is not
a temporary phenomenon").
40 Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996).
4" Id. at 746; see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir.
1995) (reversing class certification of a class of all hemophiliacs exposed to HIV through
blood transfusions because the potential that one jury would "hold the fate of an industry
in the palm of its hand").
42 See Julie Gannon Shoop, Courts Split on State Tobacco Class Actions, 34-JAN TRIAL
18, at 18 (noting that the coalition of more than 60 plaintiff law firms that filed the case is
now pursuing the same claims by filing smaller class actions in state courts around the
country).
43 See id; see also Milo Geyelin, In Florida, A Vast Tobacco Case Looms, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 1, 1998 at BI (estimating that Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 672 So. 2d 39
(Fla. App. 1996), may involve 40,000 to I million smokers).
4 See Barnes v. American Tobacco Co., 176 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that
the issues of addiction and treatment require individual treatment); Engle, 672 So. 2d at 41
(affirming class certification on behalf of all smokers but noting that certain individual
issues will have to be tried for each class member).
41 See In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1001 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing the 1985
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national asbestos dispute resolution scheme, but to date, there has been no
congressional response." If the number and size of mass tort actions continue to
flood the courts, congressional response by legislation for each new mass tort would
be impractical.4 7 If such an approach prevailed, Congress would be faced with
creating resolution schemes for asbestos, breast implants, tobacco, and now fen-phen.
In the absence of a comprehensive congressional scheme to deal with mass tort
actions, 8 the federal courts, lacking authority to replace state tort law, have
attempted to utilize the current tools available to craft judicial solutions to the
problems of mass tort actions.49
C. The Traditional Skepticism About Using Class Actions for Mass Torts
Class actions are generally an effective and efficient means for a court to handle
a large number of similar claims and bind all the parties.5" Class actions allow a
Rand Corporation report).
46 See Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); see also Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2302 (1999) (calling for a national legislation to deal
with asbestos litigation). Although Congress has provided a solution in the Bankruptcy
Code, see 11 U.S.C. § 524 (1994), its applicability is limited to disposing of claims only
when a defendant declares bankruptcy. See Ortiz, 119 S. Ct. at 2300 (reversing global
settlement of "limited fund" class action where the only existence of a limited fund was due
to the parties' agreement); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.29 (3d ed. 1995); see
also Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (explaining that special remedial
schemes such as bankruptcy are consistent with due process).
41 In March 1999, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry Hyde introduced the
Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act. See Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, H.R.
1283, 106th Cong. (1999). Neither this proposal nor any other appears likely to become law
anytime soon. See Loiacono, supra note 33, at I I (quoting Henry Hyde as acknowledging
that the hearings on the bill are "only the beginning"). Indeed, both plaintiffs' attorneys
and at least one manufacturer appear opposed to the bill. See id. (noting that ATLA
president Richard Middleton and general counsel for Owens-Coming offered testimony
opposing the Bill). The joint opposition suggests that passage of a bill dealing with asbestos
is unlikely even a decade after the height of the problem. See id.
4 For example, Judge Weinstein has proposed either a quasi-national insurance scheme
or a "National Disaster Court" that would address injuries in mass tort cases. See
WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 32-36. For discussion of other comprehensive solutions, see
REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 34, at 48-59.
41 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 136 ("Faced with innovative district court solutions
to seemingly intractable problems, the appellate courts have begun to be slightly more
sympathetic to class actions in mass tort cases."); see also REPORT ON MASS TORT
LITIGATION, supra note 34, at 29 (noting that Judge Schwarzer has observed that "the
pressures generated by mass tort litigation are driving the courts toward comprehensive
aggregative procedures").
50 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 26; see also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855
F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1988) (acknowledging that class actions "achieve the economies
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single person, or a small number of people, whom the court designates as
representative of the other members of the class, to resolve a large number of claims
in an efficient manner through the use of a single trial, even if in bifurcated stages.5
A court can make a determination of liability, and particularly of causation, at one
time if a single event or series of events allegedly caused the same or essentially
similar effect on each plaintiff.5"
There is historical and continuing skepticism about the usefulness of the class
action device in mass tort litigation." This skepticism stems from the idea that
proposed class members have a "vital interest in controlling their own litigation"
when it involves personal injuries. 4 This historical distrust continues to the present
day as evidenced by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Amchem Products v.
Windsor.5 Although the Supreme Court recognized that "the text of the rule does not
categorically exclude mass tort cases from class certification and district courts...
have been certifying such cases in increasing number,"56 the Court urged lower courts
to heed the comments to Rule 23(b)(3)," which explicitly caution against the use of
class actions in mass tort cases. 58 Accordingly, most courts have denied motions for
class certification in mass tort personal injury actions, especially actions alleging
negligence over extended periods.59
of time, effort, and expense").
51 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 26; Osborne v. Subaru of America, Inc., 198 Cal.
App. 3d 646, 658 (1988).
52 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 26.
" See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 150 (2d Cir. 1987)
(explaining the weaknesses of proving causation by a class action device when the strength
of plaintiff's cases is widely varied and uncertain). For a brief overview of the historical
basis for courts' distrust of class actions in mass tort, personal injury, and wrongful death
cases, see 3 NEWBERG, supra note 17, § 17.02.
14 Yandle v. PPG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 572 (E.D. Tex. 1974); see also Ouellette
v. International Paper Co., 86 F.R.D. 476, 483 (D. Vt. 1980) (noting that personal injury
"claims are likely to be the kind that individuals have an interest in prosecuting
separately").
11 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
56 Id. at 625.
" See id.
'8 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note ("A 'mass accident' resulting
in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of
the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses
of liability, would be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.").
" See, e.g., In re Rhone-Polenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995)
(observing that most federal courts have refused to permit the use of class action device in
mass tort cases); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 1987)
(denying class certification and criticizing "usefulness of class actions" due to
individualistic nature of determining causation issue in regards to defoliant exposure).
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Courts generally deny motions for class certification, finding mass adjudication
inappropriate, if no single event or accident causes similar harm and no single
proximate cause applies equally to each potential class member." Leading cases that
have certified classes in mass torts have not generally certified them for resolution of
personal injury claims.6
In In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation,62 the Second Circuit
approved class certification solely for the purpose of resolving the military contractor
defense.63 The military contractor defense alone was common to all the plaintiffs and
was of central importance to the case.64 The Second Circuit noted that "if the
[military contractor] defense succeeds, the entire litigation is disposed of. '65 Had the
action involved civilians exposed to dioxin, the Second Circuit would have viewed
class certification as error.66 The Third Circuit took a similar view in In re School
Asbestos Litigation.67 The court in School Asbestos noted that class actions are
appropriate for property damages, but not personal injury cases, because asbestos has
the same effect on different buildings, whereas the effect on different people is not the
same. 6' This view, therefore, denies class certification to resolve any of the common
issues of duty, breach, or generic causation, in part, because it rejects the idea that
certification would improve the efficiency of the litigation.
Even those courts that have allowed class certification for personal injury mass
tort cases have not allowed matters of individual causation to be determined on a
representative basis. In Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp.,69 the Sixth Circuit
approved class certification in an environmental "toxic tort" case, which alleged
personal injuries occurred as a result of ingesting water contaminated by the
defendant's landfill.70 The Sixth Circuit rejected the idea that "individualization of
60 See In re Northern Dist. of California, Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693
F.2d 847, 852 (9th Cir. 1982); CARL ROBERT ARON ET AL., 1 CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND
PRACTICE § 15:16 (1987) ("In mass tort actions, individual questions are generally held to
predominate over common questions.").
61 See Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating
that In re Agent Orange and In re School Asbestos are the leading cases certifying classes
in mass torts); see also In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 166-67 (allowing class certification
due to the centrality of the military contractor defense); In re School Asbestos Litig., 789
F.2d 996, 1010-11 (3d Cir. 1986) (allowing class certification for property damages only).
62 818 F.2d 164 (2d Cir.1987).
63 See id at 166.
6' See id. at 167.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 166.
61 789 F.2d at 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
61 See id at 1009-11; see also In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433, 438-42
(M.D. Pa. 1980) (certifying class action for economic claims, but not for personal injuries).
69 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
70 See id at 1191-93.
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issues ... justifi[es] ... denying class action treatment in mass tort[s]" in favor of
"the increasingly insistent need for a more efficient method of disposing of a large
number of lawsuits arising out of a... single course of conduct.",7' The mere fact
that individual damages would have to be determined after common questions
concerning the defendant's liability did not forbid the use of class actions. 72 The
Sixth Circuit approved the district court's certification of five representative plaintiffs
to represent the remainder of the class on the issue of generic causation. 73 Resolution
of this issue only determined that plaintiffs' exposure to the chemical contaminants
had the capacity to cause the harm alleged. Each individual plaintiff was still
required to prove proximate cause-namely to show that his or her specific injuries
or damages were proximately caused by ingestion or other use of contaminated
water. 74 The Sixth Circuit's admonition that "generalized proofs will not suffice to
prove individual damages" '75 clearly contemplated further adjudication of the
plaintiffs' claims on the issue of individualized causation.76
The Sixth, Fifth77 and Ninth Circuits'M divergence from the Second, Third, and
Seventh Circuits' view merely concerns the efficiency ofthis approach. 79 The Second
Circuit in Agent Orange recognized that even if courts could resolve generic
causation on a class basis, they would have to conduct separate trials on individual
causation for each plaintiff.80 As the Second Circuit explained, class certification on
a generic causation issue has three possible outcomes: (1) the exposure always
causes harm; (2) the exposure never causes harm; or (3) exposure may or may not
cause harm.8' The Sixth Circuit recognized that resolution of this issue, along with
other liability questions, may improve the efficiency of handling mass tort cases;
71 Id. at 1196-97.
72 See id. at 1197.
71 See id. at 1200.
74 See id.
75 Id.
76 This issue was also recognized by the Second Circuit in deciding the inefficiency of
class treatment of the inefficiency of the generic causation issue. See In re Agent Orange,
818 F.2d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 1987).
7 See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that class
action treatment is appropriate for trial of common defenses and punitive damages).
71 See Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir. 1996) (expressing
approval of the Sixth Circuit approach). Although the Ninth Circuit denied certification in
In re Northern District ofCalifornia, Dalkon Shield IUD Litigation, 693 F.2d 847,852 (9th
Cir. 1982), the Dalkon Shielddecision did not prohibit certification of classes in every mass
tort case. See Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1230.
71 Cf Valentino, 97 F.3d at 1230-33 (discussing the differences in class certification in
product liability personal injury cases between the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuit with
those of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits).
80 See Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 164.
s' See id at 164-65.
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indeed, ifthejudge orjury were to find that there was no evidence of exposure orthat
the exposure never causes harm, there would be no need for further adjudication. 2
However, even if common questions are resolved, the trial court is left with the task
of trying hundreds if not thousands of individual cases-a process that could take
years. 3
D. The Traditional Use of Consolidation & Bellwether Plaintiffs
Courts rejecting class action treatment for the common issues in mass tort
personal injury cases remain faced with the specter of protracted proceedings and
lengthy delays demanded by resolving hundreds or thousands of claims. Those courts
that refuse to certify mass tort class actions often utilize consolidation under Rule
42"4 or occasionally joinder under Rule 20.8' The transfer of actions in different
districts under the coordination and consolidation of the Multidistrict Litigation
82 See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717,781-83 (3d Cir. 1994)
(granting summary judgment on all plaintiffs' claims after determining that plaintiffs had
not proved sufficient exposure to dioxins and furans); Thomas v. FAG Bearings Corp., 846
F. Supp. 1382, 1398-99 (W.D. Mo. 1994) (granting summary judgment because third party
plaintiff failed to show that defendants' release caused the contamination).
93 See Owens-Illinois, Inc., v. Levin, 792 F. Supp. 429, 431 (D. Md. 1992) (estimating
that trying 9000 asbestos cases would take over 100 years); Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751
F. Supp. 649, 652 (E.D. Tex. 1990) ("If the Court could somehow close thirty cases a
month, it would take six and one-half years to try these [2298] cases."), affd in part,
vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). Apparently, the courts in Texas are more
efficient than those in Maryland, but nonetheless, trying a large number of cases strains the
courts' resources.
14 See Rose v. Medtronics, Inc., 107 Cal. App. 3d 150, 155, 166 (1980) (citing a list of
federal courts declining to certify mass tort class actions and stating that "consolidation of
actions is the preferred procedure"); see also Ripa v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 660
A.2d 521, 533 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (observing that "tons of thousands of
asbestos claims are proceeding in the federal courts on a consolidated basis"). FED. R. CIV.
P. 42(a) provides:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before
the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue
in the actions; it may order all of the actions consolidated; and it may make
such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary
costs or delay.
8 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow large numbers of plaintiffs to join a single
action. Rule 20 allows for permissive joinder where the plaintiffs assert a right to relief
jointly or assert separate rights to relief arising out of the same transaction or occurrence.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 20. Although, a large number of plaintiffs does not automatically
preclude joinder, multiple plaintiffs claiming exposure to the same source of toxins at
different places and at different times probably cannot meet the "same transaction or
occurrence" requirement of Rule 20. See Shawn Copeland et al., Toxic Tort and
Environmental Matters: Civil Litigation, 64 ALI-ABA 33 (Jan. 22, 1998).
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(MDL) procedures can also accomplish such consolidation.86 Although the MDL
procedures contemplate that actions are transferred for the purposes of pretrial
proceedings and are to be remanded for trial to the district from which the action was
transferred, in practice only a small percentage of actions are remanded. 7 Most
actions are either settled in the transferee court or tried in the transferee court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), change of venue, or parties' consent.8" Under any
ofthe consolidation mechanisms, the primary prerequisite is that the actions involve
a common question of law or fact, and that the common issue be central to the actions
to be consolidated.8 9  .
Although consolidation improves the efficiency of the pre-trial process, courts
still face the daunting possibility of adjudicating numerous similar claims." Unlike
a class action, consolidation of separate actions "does not merge the suits into a single
cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit
parties in another."' Accordingly, consolidated actions do not permit a claimant the
right to "opt-out" as does a class action certified under Rule 23(b)(3). 92
86 See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994). Multi-district litigation procedures provide that upon
the motion of any party or upon the court's own motion, the nine-member Judicial Panel
on Multi-district Litigation will order transfer if the following prerequisites are met: (1) the
actions to be coordinated or consolidated involve one or more common questions of fact;
(2) transfer will promote the convenience of the parties and witnesses; and (3) transfer must
result in the just and efficient conduct of the actions transferred. See id.
87 See Copeland et al., supra note 85; at 40.
88 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) (allowing transfer "[flor the convenience
of parties.... in the interest of justice"). Indeed, in a complicated mass tort litigation, it is
probably in the interest of the parties to have a judge familiar with the procedural and
substantive background of the litigation preside over the trial.
89 See, e.g., Molever v. Levenson, 539 F.2d 996 (4th Cir. 1976) (demonstrating the
harmful effects of erroneous consolidation when there is not a "common question of law or
fact").
90 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 323 (3d ed. 1995) ("[I]n appropriate
circumstances, a joint trial of common issues may be feasible, followed by separate trials
of remaining issues.").
9' In re TMI Litig., Nos. 96-7623 et al., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 28415, *336 (3d Cir.
Nov. 2, 1999) (quoting Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 497 (1933)); Advey
v. Celotex, 962 F.2d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1992) (explaining that consolidation "does not
merge the independent actions into one suit"); see also Charles Silver, Comparing Class
Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495, 497 (1991) ("[A] class action is a single
lawsuit that binds a large number of people, while a consolidation is a set of independent
lawsuits that are processed in a coordinated and relatively efficient way.").
92 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 139.
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The use of "bellwether '93 or "test" plaintiffs has developed as an acceptable
alternative to the use of class actions.94 The bellwether approach focuses on the trial
of a small number of plaintiffs, usually with the claims of the other plaintiffs stayed
pending resolution of the test cases." There are essentially four traditional methods
of selecting bellwether plaintiffs: (1) plaintiffs' counsel selects all of the bellwether
plaintiffs; (2) each side selects an equal number of representatives; (3) each side
nominates plaintiffs, and the judge selects the representatives; or (4) representatives
are selected from categories of plaintiffs." The traditional use of bellwether trials
facilitates settlement by providing a representative picture of a range of verdicts.97
Each method of selection, however, has its drawbacks. As it is best to negotiate
from the strongest position possible, allowing the parties to pick or recommend
bellwether plaintiffs results in each side picking the most advantageous cases for their
position." If plaintiffs select all the bellwethers, they will pick what they believe are
the strongest cases. Each side choosing or recommending the bellwether plaintiffs
will probably result in a trial of the extremes-the strongest picked by the plaintiff
and the weakest picked by the defendant-without a clear representation of the
middle-of-the road claims.9 Selection of cases by random sampling, which is
designed to predict the average outcome, may result in the opposite problem because
it would ignore the best and the worst cases.'
Resolution of the bellwether plaintiffs' claims may not resolve the entire dispute
even if the court decides on a motion for summary judgment that there are insufficient
9' "The term bellwether is derived from the ancient practice of belling a wether (a male
sheep) selected to lead his flock." In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir.
1997). The ultimate purpose was to determine the confidence of the flock "that the wether
would not lead them astray." Id. A similar analogy applies to the use of test plaintiffs in
mass torts.
See Faulk et al., supra note 20, at 791-92.
9 See Copeland et al., supra note 85, at 44.
See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1988).
97 See Copeland et al., supra note 85, at 44; Faulk et al., supra note 20, at 806.
"S See, e.g., In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1019 (explaining that where each side picks the
bellwethers, it is simply a trial of the best and worst cases).
9 See Faulk et al., supra note 20, at 793; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, John
Crane, Inc. v. Abate, 119 S. Ct. 1096 (1999) (No. 98-873) (arguing that plaintiffs chose the
"most sympathetic and inflammatory" cases that were "wholly atypical" of the other 1300
consolidated claims).
" See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 663-64 (E.D. Tex. 1990)
(using statistically significant plaintiffs to determine average value), aff'd in part and
vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998). Although the district court's extrapolation
to non-bellwether plaintiffs in Cimino is controversial, using the average to determine a
settlement value is not. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and
Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561, 573-75 (1993) [hereinafter
Bone, Statistical Adjudication].
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facts to establish liability on a common issue."°' Alternatively, a trial of the
bellwether claims may facilitate a settlement of the remaining non-bellwether
plaintiffs. 2 If the trial of the bellwether plaintiffs does not result in a settlement of
the remaining claims, the court is left potentially with the same daunting task it
encountered before the bellwether trial-trial of the remaining non-bellwether
claims.'0 3 Although the court may attempt to continue to try select groups of
plaintiffs until a settlement is reached, the possibility remains that the court would
have to try all of the consolidated cases.
II. THE COURTS ATTEMPT To CRAFT A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Whether the courts use a class action or consolidation, courts still face the
possibility of resolving issues unique to individual plaintiffs, particularly the question
of individual causation. In the absence of congressional response to the problems,
district courts have resorted to creative procedures to improve the efficiency of
resolving mass torts. 4 In the last two years, two United States Courts of Appeals
have approved the extrapolation of the results of bellwether trials to non-bellwether
plaintiffs. Although both approaches utilize similar underlying principles, the
mechanics of the approaches differ.
A. The Ninth Circuit's Approach: Hilao v. Marcos
Victims of torture, summary execution, and disappearance during the regime of
the former President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos, brought claims in
federal district court in Hawaii for human rights violations during the period when
Marcos imposed martial law (from September 1972 to February 1986).'05 The
plaintiffs filed suits for damages in the form of a class action, as well as individual
direct actions. 0 6 Granting class certification to all civilian citizens of the Marcos
... See, e.g., In re TMI Litig., Nos. 96-7263et al., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 28415, at *347
(3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1999) (reversing the extension of summary judgment to non-Trial plaintiffs
for failure to present sufficient evidence of exposure); see also Deluca v. Merrel Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941, 952 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that collateral estoppel
principles did not permit the extension of the findings of a multi-district litigation,
consolidated common issues trial to plaintiffs not parties to that trial).
'02 See Faulk et al., supra note 20, at 792.
103 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 139-41 (discussing the problems of consolidation in
the asbestos context).
4 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 38.2 (3rd ed. 1995).
'os See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460,
1461 (D. Haw. 1995), affd by, Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 771 (9th Cir. 1996).
106 See In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1461.
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Regime from 1972 to 1986 resulted in a class of nearly 10,000 claimants.0 7 The
district court split the trial into three phases: (1) liability, (2) exemplary damages,
and (3) compensatory damages."' In Phase III, the compensatory damage phase, the
court allowed the jury to consider the damages to a random sample of plaintiffs as
representative of the injuries suffered by those in three subclasses. 9 The court
utilized this random sample representative method because "[p]ragmatically, thejury
could not hear testimony of nearly 10,000 plaintiffs.., within any practicable and
reasonable time, to do justice to the class members." ' 0 Importantly, however,
individual plaintiffs were allowed to opt out of the certified class action and present
their compensatory damage claims to the jury in a separate part of the trial."'
After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on liability in Phase I,
and the jury returned a verdict of $1.2 billion in punitive damages in Phase II, the
judge appointed a special master, as a court-appointed expert, to supervise
proceedings related to the compensatory damage phase of the trial." 2 In the
compensatory phase, the class action plaintiffs presented their case to the jury by
using a random sample of plaintiffs chosen by a statistical sampling expert.' ' Using
a well-known statistical tool, the expert formulated a plan to randomly select 137
claims." 4 This selection process achieved a"95% statistical confidence level that all
claims would fall within the ambit of the 137 randomly selected claims.""' 5 The
special master then reviewed the testimony of the 137 to determine: (1) whether the
abuse claimed fell within one of the three definitions presented during the liability
phase; (2) whether the Philippine military or paramilitary participated in the abuse;
and (3) whether the abuse occurred during the class period." 6 The Special Master
made damage determinations by ranking each claim based on seven factors. '7 When
'07 See id at 1462.
OS See id
'o See id The three subclasses consisted of (1) tortured plaintiffs, (2) families of those
subjected to summary execution, and (3) families of those who disappeared as a result of
the actions of Marcos. See id.
110 Id.
.. See id
112 See id at 1463-64.
"'3 See id at 1464. The statistician was an expert in the field of inferential statistics and
survey sampling. See id.
14 See id at 1465. The 137 claims were randomly selected by computer. See Hilao, 103
F.3d at 782. Of the claims selected, 67 were for torture, 52 were for summary execution,
and 18 were for disappearance. See id
... In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1464-65.
116 See id at 1465.
" 7 These factors consisted of the following: (1) physical torture and the methods used;
(2) mental abuse; (3) amount of time the torture lasted; (4) length of detention; (5) physical
and/or mental injuries; (6) victim's age; and (7) actual losses. See id at 1466. Using the
95% validity rate, the Special Master also took into account the number of claims likely to
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the jury received the Special Master's testimony and report, however, the court
specifically instructed the jury that it was entitled to modify or reject the
recommendation of the Special Master on the basis of the testimony of the 137
plaintiffs. 8 The jury was entitled to make its own judgment as to the individual
damages of the 137 bellwether plaintiffs and aggregation of those claims to the
class.' After five days of deliberation, thejury found 131 of the randomly sampled
claims to be valid and returned a verdict of approximately $766 million, only $1
million less than the Special Master recommended. 20
The district court considered the implications of statistical sampling on the
defendant's constitutional rights to due process and to ajury trial.' In making this
determination, the district court relied heavily on the reasoning in Cimino v. Raymark
Industries,' the analysis of academic commentators that aggregate trials do not
violate due process,' and the procedural due process test set forth by the Supreme
Court in Matthews v. Eldridge.'24 The district court concluded that "'the aggregate
trial is, in some vital respects, superior to the individual trial"' and held that the use
of statistical sampling did not violate due process.'25 Similarly, the court determined
that the procedures used to facilitate the presentation of evidence did not violate the
defendant's Seventh Amendment right to ajury trial as the "[p]ragmatic application
of [the rules of evidence and civil procedure] ... is all that is necessary."'26
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the defendant challenged the method used by the
court to determine the validity of the class claims.'27 Due to the defendant's failure
to raise questions about the determination of the size of the compensatory award, the
only issue that the Ninth Circuit considered was the validity ofthe methodology used
be statistically invalid. See Sol Schreiber & Laura D. Weissbach, In Re Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos Human Rights Litigation: A Personal Account of the Role of the Special Master,
31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 475, 479 (1998).
... See In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1466.
119 See id
"2' See id. The ultimate determination by the jury varied somewhat from the
recommendation of the Special Master; for example, the jury reinstated three of the five
claims found to be invalid and did not follow 46 of the recommendations for statistically
sampled claims. See Schreiber & Weissbach, supra note 117, at 486.
121 See In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1467.
22 See id; see also Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
Cimino is discussed infra at notes 148-79 and accompanying text.
23 See In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1467-68; see also Michael J. Saks & Peter David
Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits ofAggregation and Sampling in the
Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815, 827 (1992).
24 See In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1467; see also Matthews, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Matthews is discussed infra at notes 277-81 and accompanying text.
125 In re Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1467 (quoting Saks & Blanck, supra note 123, at 827).
126 Id at 1468.
127 See Hilao v. Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 784 (9th Cir. 1996).
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in determining the individual class claims. 2 ' The only question involved in
determining the class members' claims was whether the individual claims were proven
by sufficient evidence, because the jury had already decided the general issue of
liability.'29 The Ninth Circuit clearly recognized that the due process claim "raise[d]
serious questions."'3 ° The Ninth Circuit relied on Matthews to conclude that: (I) the
unorthodox methodology could bejustified by the time and judicial resources required
to try the nearly 10,000 claims; and (2) the defendant's only interest was in the total
amount of damages, not to whom the damages were paid.' 3 ' The Ninth Circuit did,
however, note that the procedure used might present a violation of the due process
rights of class members, but it did not consider that issue, as no plaintiff raised it on
appeal.'32
The Hilao decision marked a departure from prior Ninth Circuit jurisprudence
on the utility of mass tort class actions.133 The critical distinction is whether
individual causation must be proven by individual trials or whether a "summary
review of transcripts of selected.., victims ... able to be deposed" comports with
the notion of due process.'34 Although the unique facts of Hilao present different
causation issues than those in the typical mass tort case, an analogy exists. With
each individual, questions apply to individual causation issues; for example, whether
the action wasjustified and the degree of injury and proximate cause. Even assuming
the Ninth Circuit correctly rejected these issues raised on defendant's appeal, two
questions remain: (1) whether mandatory statistical sampling violates a plaintiff's
due process rights by awarding damages based solely on the testimony ofa statistical
expert; and (2) whether the determination of individual causation based solely on a
statistical expert's testimony violates the right to a jury trial.
126 Unfortunately, the defendant's appeal was apparently poorly litigated. The grounds
on which the defendant challenged the due process claims were unclear, and the defendant
failed to question the propriety of the compensatory damages methodology until its reply
brief, resulting in waiver of the issue. See id at 784 & n.11.
129 See id at 784.
130 Id. at 785.
3 ' See id at 786 (citing Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334).
132 See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 785 & n.13. Given the fact that plaintiffs were entitled to opt
out of the class, there would seem to be little harm to any plaintiff's due process rights.
113 Compare id with Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting due process concerns as to adequacy of notification of potential plaintiffs and abuse
of discretion regarding the predominance requirement). Citation of Stering v. Velsicol
Chem. Co. in the Hilao dissent by Judge Rymer illuminates this critical departure. See
Hilao, 103 F.3d at 788 (Rymer, J., concurring and dissenting) (explaining that "transcripts
of a selected sample of victims" for inferring the extent of injury does not "comport[ ] with
fundamental notions of due process").
134 Hilao, 103 F.3d at 788.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
B. The Fifth Circuit's Proposal.: In re Chevron
The Fifth Circuit considered the question of utilizing statistics to extrapolate the
results of bellwether trials, not in the context of a class action, but in the context of
a Rule 42(a) consolidation.'35 More than 3000 plaintiffs brought suit against
Chevron for personal injuries and property damage as a result of drinking water
contaminated by Chevron's chemical waste. 36 The district court approved a trial
plan for adjudicating the issues of "general liability or causation" and individual
causation using thirty bellwether plaintiffs, fifteen selected by the plaintiffs and
fifteen selected by the defendants." 7 The defendant, Chevron, petitioned the Fifth
Circuit for a writ of mandamus for relief from the trial plan."' In evaluating the trial
plan, the Fifth Circuit readily concluded that a selection process, whereby each side
chose an equal number of bellwether plaintiffs, could be used to facilitate settlement,
but not as representative of the remaining claims. 39 The Fifth Circuit's holding
applied to this "particular sample of thirty cases.., lacking in representativeness."' 4
The court in Chevron suggested that a trial court could choose a representative
sample by inferential statistics.'4 ' In order to comport with due process concerns, the
district court had to find that the sample was representative based on "competent,
scientific, statistical evidence that identifies the variables involved and that provides
a sample of sufficient size so as to permit a finding that there is a sufficient level of
confidence that the results obtained reflect results that would be obtained from trials
of the whole."' 42 Relying heavily on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hilao, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that a "unitary trial" ofa randomly selected, statistically significant
sample would comport with the "historical understanding of both procedural and
substantive due process.''
Although the Chevron decision approved the use of extrapolation of the results
of "bellwether plaintiffs," there are important limitations.'" First, and perhaps most
importantly, the extrapolation of randomly selected, statistically significant bellwether
plaintiffs in Chevron would be accomplished with the mutual assent of the parties.145
131 See In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir. 1997); see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 42(a); supra note 84.
136 See In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1017.
137 See id
138 See id at 1016.
9 See id. at 1019-20.
140 Id. at 1020.
141 See id
142 Id.
',3 Id at 1021 (citing Hilao, 103 F.3d at 782-84, 786).
144 See id at 1022.
'41 It is clear that defendant Chevron would have agreed to the use of a statistically sound
bellwether trial process. See id at 1022 (Jones, J., concurring).
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Second, the approval of a unitary trial based on extrapolating bellwether plaintiffs
from statistical samples is arguably dicta.'46 Finally, even among the Fifth Circuit
panels, there is disagreement about the validity of such a trial plan.'47
C. The Suggestion By Professors Saks & Blanck: Cimino v. Raymark Industries
Numerous commentators have endorsed and heralded the utility of statistical
sampling.'48 Professors Saks and Blanck are perhaps the best known supporters of
extrapolating statistical sampling techniques. 49 Professors Saks and Blanck utilized,
by way of illustration, the aggregation applied in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, "0
an action consolidating over 3000 asbestos cases.' 5' In Cimino, the court certified
the consolidated cases for class action treatment and divided the trial into three
phases.'52 In Phase I, the court utilized procedures approved by the Fifth Circuit in
146 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 318-19 (5th Cir. 1998).
147 Compare In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1020-21 (stating that such a trial plan can be
valid if it is representative) with Cimino, 151 F.3d at 336-38 (providing that such a trial
plan fails to adequately address the issue of damages).
148 See, e.g., Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 100; Victoria Branton, A Case
for the Jury?: Seventh Amendment Rights in Asbestos Litigation, 3 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R.
231 (1998) (arguing that "case aggregation" is consistent with the Seventh Amendment);
Faulk et al., supra note 20; Saks & Blanck, supra note 123; see also Manuel L. Real, What
Evil Have We Wrought: Class Action, Mass Torts, And Settlement, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
437 (1998) (advocating class action treatment of mass torts); Laurens Walker & John
Monahan, Sampling Damages, 83 IOWA L. REv. 545, 546 (1998) ("[A] complete solution
of the numbers problem in mass torts can only be achieved by abandoning any pretense of
individual adjudication and random sampling damages without apology."); Patrick
Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and The Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83
IOWA L. REv. 499, 502 (1998) (arguing that class action treatment of mass torts does not
violate the Seventh Amendment).
141 See Saks & Blanck, supra note 123 and accompanying text. The Chevron court relied
on Professor Saks and Blanck's article for support. See In re Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1020.
Moreover, numerous commentators have endorsed or sought to improve upon their analysis.
See, e.g., Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 100; Faulk et al., supra note 20; see
also Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, The Limits of Sampling and Consolidation
in Mass Tort Trials: Justice Improved or Justice Altered?, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43
(1998) (arguing for improvements and recognizing the deficiencies in extrapolating
bellwether results, but advocating their use in mass tort cases).
"0 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297
(5th Cir. 1998). Although a three-judge panel on the Fifth Circuit rejected the procedure
utilized by Judge Parker in Cimino, see Cimino, 151 F.3d at 302, Professors Saks and
Blanck's proposal and arguments in support were not dependant on the approval of the
Cimino procedure.
151 See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 652.
152 See id at 652-53.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Jenkins v. Raymark Industries'.. to resolve common issues, such as the defective
nature of asbestos, inadequacy ofwarningso, the state of the art, and punitive damages
for the entire class.'54 In Phase II, the court determined the questions about the length
and sufficiency of exposure at each of the worksites where asbestos was used.'
Phase III divided all of the consolidated claims into five disease categories and
randomly selected a group of bellwether plaintiffs for each category.'56 The randomly
selected bellwether claims were tried before ajury, and expert testimony established
that the samples on the whole achieved a ninety-nine percent confidence level.'57
After the jury verdicts for the bellwether plaintiffs, the court calculated averages for
each disease category to award the remaining non-bellwether plaintiffs.'
The district court in Cimino and Professors Saks and Blanckjustified the use of
aggregation as meeting the requirements of due process based on the reliability ofthe
methods and a balancing of interests."59 Judge Parkerjustified the use of statistics in
the asbestos context by a lengthy analysis of statistical sampling that included an
overview of its use in other litigation contexts. 60 In addition, Professor Bone
analogized the utilization of aggregation as similar to class actions brought under
Rule 23(b)(3):
In both procedures, the outcome of litigation involving a few parties is
imposed on a larger group. In both, the purpose of adjudicating on a
groupwide basis is to reduce the social and private costs of litigation and
to facilitate suits that might not be cost-effective if brought separately.
Moreover, when factual issues are identical throughout the class, the class
action functions as a trivial form of sampling. The court in effect relies
on a sample of one case, that ofthe representative plaintiff's, to adjudicate
liability for the entire class. ... [S]ubclassing serves as a trivial form of
stratfied sampling. Each representative is in effect a sample from the
subclass that she represents.'61
Perhaps the most compelling argument in favor of statistical methodology in mass
torts is the reliance on the use of formulas, statistics, and models in Title VII class
"1 782 F.2d 468, 470-73 (5th Cir. 1986).
114 See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653.
155 See id
156 See id There were a total of 160 representative plaintiffs split into the following
disease categories: mesothelioma (15), lung cancer (25), other cancer (20), asbestosis (50)
and pleural disease (50). See id.
'" See id at 664; Saks & Blanck, supra note 123, at 824.
'5 See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 305.
159 See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 665-66; Saks & Blanck, supra note 123, at 824.
160 See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 661-63.
161 Bone, Statistical Adjudication, supra note 100, at 569-70.
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action cases.'62 The Fifth Circuit expressly approved the use of class-wide formula
calculations to determine back-pay in a Title VII case, noting that such a measure
was "necessitated."'
6 3
The court in Cimino did not ignore the due process concerns evident in statistical
aggregation and addressed the earlier concerns of the Fifth Circuit regarding the use
of a class action in the case.'"' Previously, the Fifth Circuit had determined that
forty-one illustrative plaintiffs, fifteen chosen by plaintiffs, fifteen chosen by
defendants, and eleven designated class representatives, could not represent the
remaining 2990 class members. 65 At that time, the Fifth Circuit explained that such
a procedure could not focus on individual causation, but only on general causation
and relative risk. 66 Rather than treat the claims as discrete, the district court's trial
plan treated the claims as fungible. 167 In the view of the Fifth Circuit, too many
disparities among the various plaintiffs existed for common concerns to
predominate.
68
Taking the Fifth Circuit's concerns into consideration, the court in Cimino
appeared to implement what the Fifth Circuit would later suggest possible in
Chevron. Judge Parker divided the plaintiffs into five categories of disease, from
which 160 samples were drawn. 69 The sample cases took into account all the
variables inherent in such cases °' 0 and produced a result having a ninety-nine percent
confidence level.'' As the plaintiffs in Cimino had consented to statistical sampling,
the defendants challenged its use because ofthe one percent likelihood that the results
of the remaining plaintiffs would be significantly different.'72 The courtjustified its
use of statistics based on a "100% confidence level" that plaintiffs would be denied
access to the courts.
73
162 See Cimino, 751 F. Supp at 661.
163 See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 261 (5th Cir. 1974). The
Fifth Circuit in Cimino rejected the analogy to Title VII claims since they are equitable
remedies. See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 317-18.
" See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 709-711 (5th Cir. 1990). In Fibreboard,
these same defendants sought and received a writ of mandamus vacating the class-action
certification. See id. at 712.
165 See id at 708-09.-
'66 See id. at 711-12.
167 See id
168 See id. at 712.
'69 See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 666.
"' The variables were gender, race, whether living, whether ever smoked, wage earner
status, age, first year exposed, last year exposed, latency, years smoked, total years of
exposure, trade, and predominant craft. See Cimino, 1 51 F.3d at 309.
171 See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 666.
172 See id.
173 id.
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Although the Fifth Circuit ultimately rejected the district court's trial plan in
Cimino, the utility of statistical sampling and aggregation to non-bellwether plaintiffs
remains a continuing controversy. Rather than reject the statistical sampling and
extrapolation outright, the Fifth Circuit's Cimino opinion distinguished both Chevron
and statistical sampling in Title VII cases on Seventh Amendment grounds.'74
Because the Fifth Circuit, consequently, never addressed the due process concerns, 75
the use of extrapolation via statistical sampling by state courts remains entirely
unresolved. 76 Moreover, certain procedural oddities in the implementation of the
Cimino district court's plan distinguish it from the Chevron proposal and even
suggest the Fifth Circuit's approval of the original Cimino trial plan.'
77
In the intervening years between the district court decision in Cimino and review
by the Fifth Circuit, numerous courts have cited the techniques used in Cimino and
Hilao and approved by Chevron. 178 Even after the Fifth Circuit Cimino decision,
174 See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 318-21. In re Chevron, 109 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1997) failed
to address the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. The court in Cimino
distinguished Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 258-63 (5th Cir.
1974), upon which the district court in Cimino relied, because it was an equitable class
action brought under Rule 23(b)(2), which is not subject to the Seventh Amendment. See
Cimino, 151 F.3d at 318. The court in Cimino also distinguished, or alternatively rejected,
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Hilao. See id. at 319 (arguing that the reasoning in Hilao
is inapplicable because it failed to address the Seventh Amendment).
7 See Cimino, 151 F.3dat319.
176 The refusal of the Fifth Circuit to address the due process issue leaves wide open the
possibility of statistical sampling in state courts as the Seventh Amendment does not apply
to the states. See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (explaining
that the Seventh Amendment governs proceedings in federal courts, but not in state courts).
Although this Note focuses primarily on the Federal Rules and litigation in federal courts,
the due process arguments apply equally to proceedings in state courts.
'.. See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 305-08 (discussing Phase II). These deviations do not merit
discussion here, except to note that plaintiffs were not required to present evidence that they
even had the necessary exposure. At least one member of the Fifth Circuit panel in Cimino
indicated general approval of the original trial plan by noting that "[i]f Judge Parker had
conducted Phase II according to his plan ... the only issue would be the propriety of the
damages." Id. at 335 (Garza, J., concurring).
178 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1304 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing
the Saks & Blanck article to suggest that sample trials made sense when the number of
cases "was so great as to exert a well-nigh irresistible pressure to bend the normal rules");
In re Complaint of Clearsky Shipping Corp., Nos. 96-4099 et al., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
8569, at *4 (E.D. La. June 4, 1998) (requiring statistical representativeness prior to
extrapolation); In re Dow Coming Corp., 211 B.R. 545, 572 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (citing
Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 664); Adams v. Marathon Oil Co., 688 So. 2d 75, 76 (La. App.
5 Cir. 1997) (noting that causation and individual damage trials were held for bellwether
plaintiffs selected as "representative class members"); cf Long v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (distinguishing Fibreboard and limiting damage
discovery to a sampling of class plaintiffs); In re A.H. Robbins Co., 88 B.R. 742,746 (E.D.
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courts, including another three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit, and commentators
have continued to suggest the use of statistical sampling and extrapolation from
bellwether trials. 1
79
III. DOES THE CONSTITUTION PERMIT EXTRAPOLATION
VIA STATISTICAL SAMPLING?
The deeply-rooted traditions of Anglo-American jurisprudence consist of the
fundamental right that every party is entitled to his or her "'day in court""8 and
"[t]he right to a trial by jury in civil cases at common law."'' Neither the due
process requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments nor the Seventh
Amendment right to ajury trial are "'technical conception[s] with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances."" 8 2 These rules are balanced against
interests ofjudicial economy, avoidance of conflicting judgments, and the avoidance
Va. 1988) (conducting estimation), affd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). But see, e.g.,
Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 175 F.R.D. 578, 580-81 (D. Kan. 1997) (rejecting Hilao); Leverence
v. PFS Corp., 532 N.W.2d 735 (Wis. 1995) (rejecting a Cimino style approach).
'79 See Steamfitters v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 171 F.3d 912, 929 (3d Cir. 1999)
(acknowledging that "in some litigation contexts ... aggregation and statistical sampling
may be appropriate"); Rineheart v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 183 F.R.D. 497, 500 (M.D. La. 1998)
(suggesting the Chevron proposal after the Fifth Circuit decision in Cimino); Perez v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1249 n.2 (N.J. 1999) (citing the Chevron
proposal); supra notes 148-49; see also Allison v. Citgo Petroleum, 151 F.3d 402,419 (5th
Cir. 1998) (citing Chevron's proposal to use bellwether trials to resolve mass torts as one
possible resolution to mass tort trials with multiple issues). The Fifth Circuit panels
deciding Chevron, Cimino, and Allison were each comprised of an entirely different panel
of judges. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 406; Cimino, 151 F.3d at 299; Chevron, 109 F.3d at
1017. Judge Parker, however, served as the Cimino trial judge and on the Chevron appellate
panel. See Chevron, 109 F.3d at 1017; Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 650.
"' Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 972 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Richards
v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 2395 (1999).
18' Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 338, 343 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
The right of trial by jury in civil cases at common law is fundamental to our
history and jurisprudence.... The founders of our Nation considered the right
of trial by jury in civil cases an important bulwark against tyranny and
corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of the sovereign, or,
it might be added, to that of the judiciary.
Id.
182 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), and describing due process); see also Parklane
Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 337 (discussing the right to a jury trial); Galloway v. United States,
319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) ("The more logical conclusion ... is that the [Seventh]
Amendment was designed to preserve the basic institution of [a] jury trial.").
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of substantial litigation expenses in re-litigating identical issues.'83 Recognizing the
importance of such policies, the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts
have deemed certain types ofrelationships "sufficiently close" tojustify preclusion. '84
In short, federal courts only bind non-parties whose "interests were represented
adequately by a party in the original suit."'' 85
A. The Rights Affected by Extrapolation in Mass Torts
The decision by a court to utilize statistics and extrapolate the results of a
bellwether plaintifftrial to non-bellwether plaintiffs necessarily implicates both due
process rights and the right to a jury trial for both plaintiffs and defendants.'86
Proponents of extrapolation characterize the right affected, at least for defendants, as
a property right-the ultimate amount of money damages to be paid to the
plaintiffs.'87 The right at stake in reality, however, is a procedural due process right
either to defend or prosecute, the property interest.
88
Interestingly, the non-bellwether plaintiffs and the defendants are in a similar
situation. Non-bellwether plaintiffs would be denied the opportunity to submit their
claims to ajury, and required to rely on the presentation of claims by another plaintiff
whose claims were deemed statistically similar to their own.'89 Extrapolation,
likewise, precludes defendants from defending a non-bellwether plaintiffs claim that
the particular exposure caused that particular plaintiffs disease. This confines
defendants to defending only against the bellwether plaintiffs claim. A court utilizing
extrapolation denies the defendant the ability to present evidence on whether a
83 See Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 94-95 (5th Cir.
1977).
184 Id. at 95.
185 Id.
186 Even proponents of statistical extrapolation recognize the potential due process and
Seventh Amendment concerns. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 784-85 (9th
Cir. 1996); see also supra authorities cited in notes 148-49.
'87 See, e.g., Hilao, 103 F.3d at 785; Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649, 665-
66 (E.D. Tex. 1990), affd in part and vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
188 See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 788 (Rymer, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that
statistical extrapolation does not comport with due process).
89 Although the non-bellwether plaintiffs in both Hilao and Cimino had either opt-out
rights or had agreed to be bound by the results of the bellwether plaintiffs, see Hilao, 103
F.3d at 771; Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653, the proposal by the Chevron court and by Judge
Weinstein suggests that statistically significant bellwether plaintiffs could also bind non-
bellwether plaintiffs. See In re Chevron, 109 F.3d 1016, 1018 (5th Cir. 1997); WEINSTEIN,
supra note 6, at 135 (stating that the Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out right limits the ability of class
actions to provide global resolution to mass torts); id. at 136-37 (arguing for a mandatory
bankruptcy-style adjudication for mass torts); id. at 139 (suggesting that mandatory
consolidation would deny claimants an ability to opt-out).
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particular non-bellwether plaintiff's claim is adequately represented by the bellwether
plaintiff. 9 Although the defendant may challenge the reliability of the particular
method of extrapolation by the statistical expert, the defendant has no real
opportunity to demonstrate the dissimilarity of any particular non-bellwether
plaintiff's claims. Indeed, in Hilao and in Cimino, the only persons who testified
were the bellwether plaintiffs."9' Such limited discovery and consequent presentation
at trial hardly affords the defendant the opportunity to defend against the non-
bellwether claims. 9 To require testimony by each of the non-bellwether plaintiffs,
however, would defeat the whole purpose of extrapolation-judicial economy. 93 The
use of extrapolation via statistical sampling represents an attempt to circumvent the
necessity of presenting the entirety of every plaintiff's case.
The implications on both plaintiffs' and defendants' constitutional rights are not
limited to the mere possibility of a one to five percent chance of different outcomes. 94
A greater disparity of outcomes is likely because "[i]ndividual trials generate different
outcomes [than trials of a group of persons]."' 95 Where almost all of the factual
evidence about the non-bellwether plaintiffs is in the hands of a special master or a
statistical expert,' 96 the likelihood of different outcomes is further enhanced.' 97 The
90 For example, the Special Master in Hilao reviewed only the 137 depositions and the
proof of claim forms to determine whether the non-bellwether plaintiffs were suitably
represented. See Schreiber & Weissbach, supra note 117, at 477; see also notes 112-20 and
accompanying text.
'9 See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 301; Schreiber & Weissbach, supra note 117, at 477.
192 The only persons actually deposed in Hilao were the bellwether plaintiffs. See
Schreiber & Weissbach, supra note 117, at 477. Although the discovery in Cimino was far
more extensive, independent medical exams (IMEs) were performed on only about half the
total plaintiffs. See Cimino, 751 F. Supp. at 653 (noting that IMEs were done on only 1400
* plaintiffs).
'9' See supra notes 131 & 173 and accompanying text.
'9' A one to five percent disparity in a judgment of $766 million, wlile statistically
small, still represents a significant amount of money. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand
E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1464, 1466 (D. Haw. 1995) (indicating
judgment of $766 million with a 95% statistical confidence level), affd, 103 F.3d 767 (9th
cir. 1996).
"' Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits
of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1796 (1992) (citing Irwin A. Horowitz
& Kenneth S. Bordens, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact of Procedural Changes on
Jury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989)); see also REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION,
supra note 34, at 20 (explaining that aggregation provides plaintiffs increased power that
"enhancfes]-and perhaps exaggerat[es]-their underlying, substantive rights"); Bordens
& Horowitz, supra note 149, at 52.
196 See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rymer, J.,
concurring and dissenting) ("[Clausation [for the class] ... rested on the opinion of a
statistical expert.").
"' See Tidmarsh, supra note 195, at 1796.
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possibility of a disparity of outcomes and the limited requirements for proof of
causation and damages implicate both due process and the right to ajury trial. '98 The
question is whether the fundamental notions ofjurisprudence permit such techniques.
B. Constitutional Rights in the Context of Traditional Mechanisms
The constitutionality of statistical sampling and extrapolation is best resolved by
analyzing the question in the context ofthe two mechanisms deemed sufficiently close
to depart from the general rule that one needs to be a party to be bound by the
judgment: 99 class actions and collateral estoppel.
1. Class Actions
The class action is a non traditional litigation procedure permitting a
representative with typical claims [to] ... stand in judgment for ... a
class of similarly situated persons. ... The purpose and intent of class
action[s] ... is to adjudicate and obtain resjudicata effect on all common
issues ... not only to the representatives ... but to all others who are
'similarly situated.'"" °
To comport with the requirements of due process and the right to a jury trial, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has set forth the requirements of class certification
in Rule 23.2°1 In order to be certified, a class action must fit the four prerequisites of
Rule 23(a): (1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable
("numerosity"); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class
("commonality"); (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the class ("typicality"); and (4) the representative parties will adequately protect
the interests of the class ("adequacy").02 A mass tort class action must also meet the
two requirements of Rule 23(b)(3): 20 3 (1) common questions must predominate over
198 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (explaining that "procedural due
process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth seeking process"); Hilao,
103 F.3d at 788 (Rymer, J., concurring and dissenting).
'9' See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 39 (1940).
200 Ford v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc. 703 So. 2d 542, 544 (La. 1997).
2'0 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23; Becherer v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No.
96-1673, 1999 WL 782089 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1999) (explaining that Rule 23 protects the
minimum requirements of due process); see also supra note 5.
'20 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). For a good concise overview of class action requirements,
see Michael E. Solimine & Christine 0. Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class Action
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts ofAppeals Under Rule
23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
203 Because Rule 23(b)(1) is limited to cases where the party is obligated to treat the
members of the class alike or-instances in which numerous parties make claims against a
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individual questions ("predominance"); and (2) class resolution must be superior to
other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy
("superiority").2 In addition, Rule 23(b)(3) requires that class members be alerted
of their right to "opt-out" of the class action."'
A class action's fundamental underlying principles are that the issues required to
resolve the class representative's claims are common to the other members of the
class and that the class representatives' claims are typical of the other members of the
class.20 6 As a result, adjudication of the class representative's claims adequately
protects the absent class members' rights and provides a far superior method than
relitigating common issues numerous times.0 7 Therefore, class actions require the
defendant to have engaged in a course of conduct that affected all of the plaintiffs.
similarly.20 8
In the context of a mass tort, if the class representative fails the typicality
requirement, the class as a whole fails the superiority requirement of Rule 23 .209 For
example, if plaintiffs' injuries occur at different places, for different amounts of time,
and under different conditions, these "'factual differences .. .translate[] into
significant legal differences"' on the issues of causation.2"0 These differences require
that courts make individual determinations of the individual plaintiffs' claims.21'
Resolution of a class representative's claim would involve a different inquiry than
limited fund and Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief,
mass tort class actions are generally certified under Rule 23(b)(3). See Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997); accord Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 119 S. Ct. 2295
(1999) (reversing class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) in a mass tort asbestos case). Rule
23(b)(3) permits class certification when a class suit is "convenient and desirable."
Windsor, 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting advisory committee notes to Rule 23(b)(3)).
204 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3); Windsor, 521 U.S. at 615.
20' See Windsor, 521 U.S. at 615 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) and Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173-77 (1974)). This opt-out right is also mandated by due
process. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985).
206 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 135.
207 See McDonald v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 834 F.2d 1085, 1092 (1st Cir.
1987) ("One of the principles informing class action suits is the interest in having only one
claim instead of multiple suits .... [T]here is little apparent reason for class members to
present their own claims.")
208 See Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966, 968 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 2395 (1999).
2"9 See, e.g., Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding trial
court's refusal to certify due to failure to meet typicality requirement).
210 Windsor, 521 U.S. at 609 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610,
627 (3d Cir. 1996), affd 521 U.S. 591 (1997)); see also In re American Medical Systems,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1084 (6th Cir. 1996); Haley v. Medtronic, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 643, 654
(C.D. Cal. 1996).
2 See Windsor, 521 U.S. at'624-25.
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those of the class that the representative purportedly represents."' The standard that
each individual must prove the exposure caused his or her disease mandates that
individual causation cannot be proved on a class-wide basis. Rather, each plaintiff
must prove, and the defendant must have the opportunity to disprove, that a particular
individual's disease was or was not caused by the exposure.
Even assuming that, as a matter of law, a mass tort plaintiffs claims could be
reduced to a handful of significant variables, to permit class actions in such cases
"would cause the case to degenerate into multiple lawsuits separately tried." ' To
adequately protect the rights to due process and to a jury. trial would require a far
more complex process than utilized in either Hilao or Cimino. To be properly
representative, the class would have to be divided into subclasses, with subclass
representatives typical of the remaining members of the subclass.214 Rather than
merely subdivide the class into a handful of disease categories and use a statistician
to determine a ninety-five percent confidence level, typicality requires that each
representative's factual differences may not translate into legally significant
differences." 5 Thus, to meet the typicality requirement, the representative of each
subclass would have to be representative of each legally significant variable. 16 For
example, if there were five disease categories,217 and ten significant variables,"' and
an average of five different possible outcomes for each variable, this would produce
250 separate subclasses. Such a large number of subclasses undermines the cohesion
of the class, and therefore, fails the superiority requirement.1 9 Using a conservative
number of cases to provide a representative sample, based on Hilao and Cimino,22 °
22 Cf East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1976) (explaining that
a class representative must "suffer the same injury as the class members").
213 Daye v. Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1972), affd, 483 F.2d 294
(3d Cir. 1973).
214 Rule 23(c)(4)(B) allows the creation ofsubclasses, but also requires that each subclass
.independently satisfy the class action criteria. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B); I NEWBERG,
supra note 17, § 3.09, at 3-43.
215 See 1 NEWBERG, supra note 17, § 2.15, at 3-78, 3-8.1 (explaining that when the
factual differences create legal differences, the representative is not typical); see also
Georgine, 83 F.3d at 632 ("[A] hodgepoge of factually as well as legally different plaintiffs
... create problematic conflicts of interest... [that] necessarily destroy the possibility of
typicality.").
216 See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) ("[T]he typicality
requirement is said to limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named
plaintiffs."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.15 (3d ed. 1995); 1 NEWBERG, supra
note 17, § 2.15, at 3-78.
21" The Cimino plaintiffs were divided into five disease categories. See supra note 156.
218 The court in Hilao used 7 factors and the court in Cimino used 13 variables. See
supra notes 117 & 170.
219 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.15 (3d ed. 1995) (stating that excessive
subclasses lead to confusion).
220 In Cimino, the sample size for each subclass ranged from 15 to 50. See Cimino, 751
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would result in twenty-five bellwether claims for each subclass or a total of 6250
total bellwether trials. As this number exceeds the claims in Cimino and is more than
half the entire class in Hilao, such a high number of trials hardly produces a more
efficient outcome and demonstrates the lack of superiority of this method.22" '
Even ifa number of representatives small enough tojustify adjudicating less than
all the claims would be efficient, such statistical evidence is insufficient proof of
individual causation.
The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be
proven within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent
expert testimony. ... A possible cause only becomes 'probable' when,
in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more
likely than not that the injury was a result of its action.222
Although there is some debate about the role that statistics and probability theory
should play in the law,22 a it is significantly different from the debate over whether to
allow a plaintiff to rely entirely on probability evidence as proof of individual
22causation. 24 In order to improve judicial efficiency, the entirety of the proof for a
non-bellwether plaintiff consists of statistical evidence of results extrapolated from
the non-bellwether plaintiffs. 225 Allowing a non-bellwether plaintiff to prove
causation only through the testimony of an expert statistician because the bellwether
claim is statistically representative guts the core requirement of proof.226 The most
F. Supp. at 653; supra note 156. In Hilao, the sample size ranged from 18 to 67. See supra
note 114.
221 See MANUAL FOR COiPLEX LITIGATION § 30.15 (3d ed. 1995) ("rarely should more
than ten persons or firms be named as class representatives").
222 Cottle v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1384-85 (1992) (quoting Jones v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396, 402-03 (1985)).
223 See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a
World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385 (1985) (discussing the probability
approach to the burden of persuasion); Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971) (discussing the utilization
of mathematical methods in the legal process).
224 See Tribe, supra note 223, at 1349 (explaining that to allow plaintiff to prove
causation merely by statistical evidence would "eliminate any incentive for plaintiffs to do
more than establish the background statistics"). Indeed, this suggestion differs considerably
from mass exposure cases where general causation was certain and liability apportioned in
accordance with a market share theory. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 607
P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908 (Fla. App. 1984).
22' See supra notes 109-11, 113-26, 156-58 and accompanying text (discussing the
limited discovery and trial presentation in Hilao and Cimino).
226 See Alan D. Cullison, Identification by Probabilities and Trial By Arithmetic (A
Lesson For Beginners in How To Be Wrong With Greater Precision), 6 HOUS. L. REV. 471,
518 (1969) ("The usual basis given for rejecting expert probability testimony is the
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that can be said of the statistical evidence is "that the mathematical chances
somewhat favor the proposition. ... This [is] not enough." '
The inescapable fact is that individual causation cannot be presented sufficiently
by extrapolating results from even statistically significant class or bellwether
representatives. To require merely a showing via statistical estimates would change
the requisite proof by treating each claim as if it were fungible.228 Statistical
estimation is useful to prove general causation, but only requiring a non-bellwether
plaintiff to prove a statistical likelihood that plaintiff's disease was caused by
defendant's actions changes the burden of proof.229 Almost a hundred years ago, the
Maine Supreme Court explained:
Quantitative probability ... is only the greater chance. It is not proof...
of the proposition to be proved. That in one throw of dice there is a
quantitative probability, or greater chance, that a less number of spots
than sixes will fall uppermost is no evidence whatever that in a given
throw such was the actual result. Without something more, the actual
result.., would still be utterly unknown. The slightest real evidence that
sixes did in fact fall uppermost would outweigh all the probability
otherwise.230
inadequacy of foundation establishing initial probabilities with actual observed data."). The
Supreme Court explained in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979):
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due
Process Clause and in the realm of factfinding is to "instruct the factfinder
concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusion for a particular type of adjudication.". . . [In
civil suits], the plaintiff's burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the
evidence. The litigants thus share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.
Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
227 Smith v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 58 N.E.2d 754, 755 (Mass. 1945); accord People v.
Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968) (finding that a "trial by mathematics" so distorted the role
of the jury and disadvantaged the defense that it constituted "a miscarriage of justice").
228 See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1990); Windham v.
American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 66 (4th Cir. 1977).
229 See Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of
Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 380-90 (1986) (discussing the
standards used in courts); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk Probability,
Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts, 73
IOWA L. REv. 1001, 1050-59 (1988) (discussing the difference between naked statistics and
probabilistic evidence).
230 Day v. Boston & Maine R.R., 52 A. 771,774 (Me. 1902). In the context of statistical
sampling and extrapolation, all that can be said is that the dice fell uppermost by the
number of bellwether trials. Without some evidence presented to the jury about the non-
bellwether plaintiffs, this "proof' establishes nothing more.
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Requiring no more than statistical proof is a substantial amendment of substantive
rights, an action forbidden by the Rules Enabling Act.. and beyond the power of the
federal judiciary.232
2. Collateral Estoppel
Collateral estoppel, like class actions, serves the dual purpose of promoting
judicial economy while protecting litigants' rights to due process and to ajury trial.233
Until recently, collateral estoppel only applied when both parties were bound by the
judgment."3 In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of lllinois Foundation,235
the United States Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff should be afforded
"more than one full and fair opportunity forjudicial resolution of the same issue." '236
The Court concluded that forcing a defendant to defend a claim that the plaintiff had
fully litigated and lost in a prior action would be a misallocation of resources.237
"Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated
defendants holds out reflect[ed]... the aura of the gaming table ... [and was not]
a worthy or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure.""23 The Court cautioned,
however, that litigants who never appeared in the prior action could not be
collaterally estopped without a chance to present evidence and arguments on the
claim.239
After Blonder-Tongue, the ability of a plaintiff to assert collateral estoppel
against a defendant remained unresolved until Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.240 In
Parklane Hosiery, the Supreme Court granted trial courts "broad discretion" in
determining when offensive collateral estoppel may be utilized.24' The Court
recognized the disadvantages of offensive collateral estoppel and advised that trial
judges should take account ofthe following factors in allowing its use: (1)the ability
of the plaintiffs to join the prior action; (2) prior inconsistentjudgments; and (3) the
231 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994) (forbidding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure from
abridging, enlarging, or modifying any substantive right); see also Cimino v. Raymark
Indus., 151 F.3d 297, 312 (5th Cir. 1998).
232 See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 R2d 394, 415 (5th Cir. 1986)
("Congress' silence in face of a desparate [sic] need for federal legislation ... does not
authorize the federal judiciary to assume for itself the responsibility for formulating what
essentially are legislative solutions.").
233 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
234 See id at 327.
235 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
236 Id. at 328.
237 See id. at 329.
238 Id.
239 See id. (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)).
240 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
24! See id. at 331.
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availability of procedural opportunities in the latter action not present in the former
that are likely to cause a different result.242
Lower courts, in turn, began to adopt the idea of "virtual representation" as a
vehicle of non-party preclusion.243 Although courts initially suggested that the mere
"identity of interests" between a party and a non-party warranted application of the
doctrine, 44 courts have retreated from that position and recognized that over-
deployment of virtual representation would threaten the core principles of due process
and the right to a jury trial. 4 "The upshot is that, today, while identity of interests
remains a necessary condition for triggering virtual representation, it is not alone a
sufficient condition.2 46
A finding that a bellwether plaintiff meets the requirements of the collateral
estoppel principles would necessitate that a non-bellwether plaintiff would be
collaterally estopped from presenting his or her own claim in a later proceeding. 247
To assert that a bellwether plaintiff adequately represents an entire group that is
statistically significantly similar suggests that a later plaintiff could use offensive
collateral estoppel. 48 If a bellwether plaintiff successfully proves his case and a
court allows extrapolation from a statistically significant bellwether to the non-
bellwethers, an important question is whether a later plaintiff not involved in the first
suit, but who could demonstrate that the bellwether plaintiff was also an
appropriately statistical representative, could utilize the bellwether trial results.
Under the guidelines set forth in Parklane Hosiery, a later plaintiff, without the
opportunity to join the suit and in the absence of any intervening inconsistent
242 See id. at 329-32.
243 See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Non Party Preclusion,
67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 193,206-19 (1992).
244 See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1975).
.245 See Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 760 (1st Cir. 1994); see also
Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 43 F.3d 1054, 1070-71 (6th Cir.
1995).
246 Gonzalez, 27 F.3d at 760. Although there is no black letter rule in deciding when to
apply virtual representation, courts look at the following factors: (1) notice; (2) whether the
parties are legally responsible or in any other way accountable to the other plaintiffs; (3) a
special type of close relationship; (4) whether they consented, explicitly or implicitly, to be
bound by the judgment; (5) whether non-participation was based on tactical maneuvering
to gain an unfair advantage; and, sometimes, (6) the adequacy of the representation. See id
at 761.
247 If non-bellwether plaintiffs consent to be bound by the judgment of the bellwether
plaintiffs, the similar principle of resjudicata, rather than collateral estoppel, may apply.
See id. at 760-62.
248 See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text; see also Faulk et al., supra note 20,
at 805 n. 194 (recognizing that it is only defendants who would be collaterally estopped);
Woolley, supra note 148, at 535 ("[A] defendant who loses the first in a series of suits
involving the 'same issue' may be bound by adverse findings on that issue in later suits.").
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judgments, should be able to utilize offensive collateral estoppel to prevent a
defendant from relitigating issues resolved in the bellwether trial. 249 Thus, the
defendant could be -prevented from litigating any issue other than whether the
bellwether plaintiffwas a statistically significant representative ofthe later plaintiff.
This reasoning rests on the fallacy that proof of causation does not vary between
individuals. Yet, accepting extrapolation would eliminate any legal orlogical reason
to deny a later plaintiff the same opportunity as the non-bellwether plaintiff to rely
on the issue of individual causation resolved in the bellwether trial. The reason that
neither the non-bellwether nor the later plaintiff should be allowed to assert offensive
collateral estoppel rests on the same premise: "' [T]he issue as to which preclusion
is sought [must] be identical with the issue decided in' [the bellwether trial]."25 The
inescapable conclusion is that proof of individual causation, for either the non-
bellwether or the later plaintiff, requires evidence proving individual facts. Thus, the
mere presentation of statistical evidence alone does not suffice to resolve the issue of
individual causation in a mass tort case."'
The rules governing collateral estoppel establish the bounds of its use within the
parameters of due process and the right to a jury trial.2 12 Allowing non-bellwether
and later plaintiffs to assert collateral estoppel, based upon a mere identity of
interests, would represent a return to the already rejected notion of virtual
representation. 253 Courts realized that over-extension of the rule would violate due
process and Seventh Amendment rights.5 Revitalizing this view, by allowing
extrapolation for issues of individual causation, would no less violate those rights
today.2 "
249 See supra notes 240-47 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Rubel v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 681 F. Supp. 151, 153-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (granting plaintiff s motion for summary
judgment based on prior judgment of defendant's negligence in failing to adequately test
a pharmaceutical prior to distribution).
250 Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1987) (alteration in the original) (quoting
Capital Tel. Co. v. Patterson Tel. Co., 436 N.E.2d 461, 463 (N.Y. 1982)).
251 Cf Woolley, supra note 148, at 575 (explaining the inherent unfairness of allowing
a particularly sympathetic plaintiff to bind common issues against the defendant for all
other plaintiffs).
252 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); see also Becherer v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 96-1673, 1999 WL 7820289, * 10 (6th Cir. Sept.
30, 1999).
253 See supra notes 243-46 and accompanying text.
254 See id
255 Cf Tidmarsh, supra note 195, at 1772 n. 389 ("The simplest way to avoid this
dilemma would be to abolish the Seventh Amendment, and require all civil cases to be tried
to the court.").
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3. Consolidation
Some proponents of extrapolation techniques have asserted that consolidation
might be a"more powerful tool" than class actions in resolving mass torts.256 Indeed,
the court in Chevron proposed statistical sampling in the context of a Rule 42
consolidation,257 and the court in Cimino consolidated the asbestos claims before it.25
The mere availability of a consolidation procedure does not, however, enable
courts to escape the requirements of class actions or collateral estoppel.259 Over fifty
years ago, the Supreme Court explained in Hansberry v. Lee26° that a selection of
representatives for the purposes of litigation must have substantially the same
interests as those they are deemed to represent.26' Short of a class action, with all the
concomitant safeguards that class certification requires, the deemed "representatives"
cannot protect the requirements of due process.262 The same requirements that govern
representatives in class actions also govern consolidations:263 "There would be little
point in having Rule 23 if courts could ignore its careful structure and create defacto
class actions at will."'2 The recent Supreme Court decisions in Amchem Products
v. Windsor2 6 and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.266 both suggest that courts must strictly
adhere to the requirements set forth in Rule 23, and the use of Rule 42 does not
enable them to circumvent those requirements.267
256 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 6, at 139 (advocating estimation in consolidation); see
also Bordens & Horowitz, supra note 149, at 44 ("[Consolidation] has become an
increasingly popular weapon in the courts' search for a paradigm that permits the efficient
resolution of mass tort cases.").
257 See In re Chevron, 109F.3dat 1017.
258 See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 299.
259 See Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 2395 (1999); see also In re TMI Litig., Nos. 96-7623 et al., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
28415, at *337-41 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that extension of a summary judgment
decision to non-trial plaintiffs implicates collateral estoppel issues and their Seventh
Amendment rights).
260 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
261 See id. at 43.
262 See Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 762 (1st Cir. 1994); see also 7B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1789, at 243 (2d
ed. 1994) ("[I]f an action is not properly certified, then any judgment.., will not bind
persons who are not named parties to the dispute.").
263 See Southwest Airlines v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Inc., 546 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1977)
("[A] Ithough Hansberry involved a class action suit, its due process principles also control
res judicata cases.").
264 Tice, 162 F.3d at 973.
265 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
266 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999).
267 See Tice, 162 F.3d at 923; supra note 232.
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C. Inadequacy of Proponents'Justifications
In the context of mass tort litigation, proof of causation necessarily involves
proof not merely that a particular substance is capable of causing a particular
disease, but that in this particular instance the substance did cause or was a
substantial factor in causing the disease contracted by this particular individual.68
Requiring parties to accept extrapolation, even of statistically significant
representatives, avoids the requisite proof of individual causation and impairs the
defendant's ability to combat such a claim.269 Implicitly, at least, proponents
recognize the implication of these "solutions" on the standards of proof and attempt
to justify them as constitutionally permissible.
Proponents' justification for statistical extrapolation under the Seventh
Amendment relies on two principal arguments: (1) the scope of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure sets the bounds of the Seventh Amendment;27° and (2) the scope of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the utilization of statistics in other areas,
such as calculation of damages and equitable relief in Title VII cases.
271
Demonstration that statistical sampling violates the protections assured by class
actions and collateral estoppel refutes the first argument that such an approach is
permissible under traditional rules.272 The analogy to Title VII actions fails because
mass torts, unlike the equitable nature of Title VII actions, are subject to the Seventh
Amendment. 73 In actions at law, courts have utilized statistics to assess the amount
of damages based on a formula in ajury verdict or as one factor to prove liability, but
268 See supra notes 222-32 and accompanying text; cf REPORT ON MASS TORT
LITIGATION, supra note 34, at 29 (noting that even when generic causation and liability
issues seem clear, specific cause and extent of injuries must be proved).
269 See Gold, supra note 229, at 380 (explaining that in an individual case, statistics at
best merely establish that "a randomly selected case of disease was one that would not have
occurred absent exposure"); id. at 382-84 (explaining the difference between fact probability
and belief probability).
270 See In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460,
1468-69 (D. Haw. 1995).
271 See Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649,661-63 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Branton,
supra note 148, at 231-32 (arguing that the Seventh Amendment should not apply in
asbestos litigation).
272 See supra notes 199-255 and accompanying text.
273 See Woodell v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, 502 U.S. 93, 98 (1991) ("A
personal injury action is of course a prototypical example of an action at law, to which the
Seventh Amendment applies."). Even in Title VII cases that seek monetary relief in
addition to injunctive relief, the right to a jury trial is implicated unless the monetary
damages are only incidental. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., No. 99-8032, 1999 WL
966761 (7th Cir. Oct. 25, 1999).
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not as proof of whether an individual plaintiff was harmed.274 The utilization of
statistical calculation in the context of damages provides the dollar amount of harm
that occurred as the result of a uniform cause; it does not prove whether the plaintiff
was harmed.275 Mere calculation of damages based on the jury's formula, as
compared to substitution of proof via statistical means, does not violate the right to
a jury trial.276
The findings by courts and conclusions by commentators that aggregation
satisfies the requirements of due process based on the balancing test enunciated in
Mathews v. Eldridge2. rests on a misinterpretation of that test. The balancing test
in Mathews was created to decide when, not if, a hearing was required.27 The
Supreme Court "consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before
an individual is finally deprived of a property interest." '279 Proponents argue that the
limited resources of the judicial system require some use of a "short-cut," such as
statistical extrapolation, in order for plaintiffs to be heard at all.280 The proponents'
arguments for substituting a statistical expert's testimony about the reliability of
extrapolation in lieu of causation proof do not satisfy the due process requirements
of the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." '281
274 See Cimino, 151 F.3d at 311; supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text (discussing
the utilization of statistics to prove causation).
275 See, e.g., Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 589 (10th Cir.
1961) (approving trial plan utilizing special master to use jury verdict formula to apply
damage determination for each class member).
276 See id; Cimino, 151 F.3d at 311; see also supra notes 222-27 and accompanying text.
In cases utilizing a special master to determine damages, there is a uniformity of injury and
the master serves only to assess the amount of individual damages after a jury verdict
formula for damages. See Union Carbide, 300 F.2d at 589. Indeed, it is clear that even the
determination of damages in an action at law is the province of the jury. See Feltner v.
Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998); see also Hetzel v. Prince William
County, 523 U.S. 208, 210-12 (1998) (per curiam) (explaining that the Seventh
Amendment does not permit a court to enter a remittitur without the option of a new jury
trial).
277 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
278 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323 ("The issue in this case is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termination ... the recipient be
afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing."); see also Connecticut v. Doehr, 501
U.S. 1 (1991) (finding that a prejudgment attachment requires a prior hearing in order to
satisfy the due process clause).
279 Mathews, 424 at 333 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974)).
280 See supra notes 117 & 170 and accompanying text.
281 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333-34 (quoting Armstrong v. Mango, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965), and recognizing that the procedural safeguards mandated by due process increase
as the importance of the decision being made increases); see also Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441,451 (1973) (explaining "the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency"); Thomas W. Henderson & Tybe A. Brett, A Trial Lawyer's Commentary on
One Jurist's Musing of the Legal Occult: A Response to Judge Weinstein, 88 NW. U. L.
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Rather, the proponents' reasoning articulates an acquiescence that the limited
resources of the courts justify the mere appearance of due process and ajury trial in
place of nothing at all.282 Such reasoning ought to leave a "profound disquiet" as the
procedure "is called a trial, but it is not., 283 Fundamental notions of jurisprudence
require more than merely an appearance to adequately protect constitutional rights.
IV. How SHOULD COURTS HANDLE MASS TORT LITIGATION?
The conclusion that courts may not mandate sampling and extrapolation for
parties does not require that courts altogether abandon the use of statistically
significant bellwether plaintiffs. When faced with mass torts, courts should use
statistically significant bellwether plaintiffs. A trial of bellwether plaintiffs can be
used effectively to give the parties a representative idea of the claims' value. While
a trial consisting of a statistically significant group of plaintiffs would give the parties
a more realistic idea of the likely value of the claims during settlement discussions, 284
such a trial may not produce a settlement.
The court should also encourage the parties to agree voluntarily that the trial of
statistically significant bellwether plaintiffs will be dispositive of the non-bellwether
claims. The same constitutional concerns should not apply when both sides have
consented that a unitary trial would satisfy their due process and jury trial
concerns. 285 This, of course, presumes that the court is not faced with defendants
REV. 592, 598-99 (1994) ("Due process... prohibit[s] a court-from acting in the name of
some loosely defined communitarian/communicatarian ethic to advance or restrict interests
of parties not before it.").
282 See In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Plaintiffs... argue
that extraordinary measures are necessary if these cases are to be tried at all."); see also
supra notes 110 & 173 and accompanying text (discussing the Hilao and Cimino
rationales).
283 In re Fibreboard, 893 F.2d at 712; see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, at 617-19 (explaining that attempts to achieve judicial economy are laudable only
when they do not sacrifice procedural fairness).
284 See, e.g., In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 596 (E.D. La. 1991) ("The claims
will be scheduled for trial according to a format based on factors such as location of the
claimant and/or his property at the time of the explosion, and the extent and nature of the
damages. The goal is that after several waves are tried, a reasonable judgment value for
each category of claims will emerge and can be used to facilitate settlement."). The Report
on Mass Tort Litigation suggested that use of aggregative techniques could even reduce the
costs of settlement. See REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 34, at 18.
285 See Ank v. Koppers Co., 930 F.2d 26 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that where non-test
plaintiffs entered into a stipulation they gave the actual parties authority to represent them
and were collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues); Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 175 F.R.D.
578, 580 (D. Kan. 1997) (finding that a Hilao-style damage aggregation would be
permissible if defendant consented); see also In re TMI Litig., Nos. 96-7623 et al., 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 28415, at *341 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1999) (explaining that only a "positive
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who present a "fortress mentality," refusing any concessions or settlement.28 6
Regardless of whether the parties agree, the court may still establish a multi-
phase trial and certify at least some of the issues for class action treatment.287 Phase
I of the trial could consist of a class action trial on the issue of underlying liability
and questions of general causation.288 A court should require the jury to make
specific findings of fact related to issues of causation common to the class as a whole.
For example, the jury should make findings as to the minimum length of exposure
necessary to contract a particular disease, the minimum amount of exposure
necessary, and the types of diseases that such exposure can cause.289 Contrary to the
Second Circuit's assertion,290 certification of these issues could be dispositive of the
entire trial. If the jury were to find for the defendant, or the court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment or directed verdict because the defendant's
underlying conduct could not cause the injuries alleged by any of the plaintiffs, the
entire litigation would end.29' Jury findings as to minimum length of exposure,
manifestation by Non-Trial Plaintiffs" would allow extension ofthe bellwether plaintiff trial
results to them); cf Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., No. 96-1673,
1999 WL 782089, *10 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1999) (explaining that plaintiffs who opt-out of
a class action are neither bound by the prior litigation nor prevented from litigating their
own claims); Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that
where plaintiffs did not consent they could not be bound by the earlier litigation).
286 See, e.g., Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd in part
and vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); see also REPORT ON MASS TORT
LITIGATION, supra note 34, at 45 (noting that "scorched earth" litigation is a common
strategy).
287 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.17 (3d ed. 1995) ("[A] class may be
certified for only certain issues."). The following phases are used for illustrative purposes.
Courts can obviously tailor the order and nature of the phases as necessary for the particular
case, and depending on the litigation, certain phases may not be necessary.
288 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); In re
Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 468 (D. Wyo. 1995); see also Faulk et al., supra note
20, at 807 ("Consolidation of truly common and generic issues is no more objectionable in
a mass tort context than it would be in any other context.").
289 See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 33.28 at 329 n.1100 (3d ed. 1995)
("Special verdicts ... are likely to be helpful in establishing a basis for settling ... or
narrowing the remaining liability issues on principles of collateral estoppel.").
290 See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing In re Agent Orange).
29 See, e.g., In re TMI Litig., Nos. 96-7623 et al., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 28415, at
*341 (3d Cir. Nov. 2, 1999) (explaining that summary judgment is proper so long as the
person is an actual participant in the summary judgment proceeding); Perez v. Wyeth Lab.,
Inc., 713 A.2d 520, 524 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (finding that the bellwether
plaintiff's failure to prove duty, a question common to all plaintiffs, "effectively dispose[d]
of all of the pending claims"), rev'd on other grounds, 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999); supra
note 82; see also In re Copley, 161 F.R.D. at 468 (finding that defendant's contention that
its product could not cause the alleged injuries "created the best argument for [class action
treatment of] general causation").
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exposure levels, and potential diseases could eliminate any plaintiffs who did not meet
the requisite levels. Moreover, resolution of common claims against the defendants
may stimulate settlement.292
Only if plaintiffs prevailed on Phase I, and no settlement was achieved, would
further adjudication be required. Phase I also could resolve any affirmative defenses
that are applicable to the class as a whole.293 Although the military contractor
defense in Agent Orange would have resolved claims of the entire class, certain
affirmative defenses could be dispositive only for some of the plaintiffs. For
example, an assumption of the risk or statute of limitations defense might be time-
sensitive. If plaintiffs knew or should have known of the potential for exposure or the
harms by a certain date, a jury could find that claims after that date were barred or
could make a percentage determination as to liability of the defendant.2 1 Phase II
could resolve as a class the imposition of punitive damages, if any.295 Only after all
of these issues are resolved is it necessary to turn to the question of individual
causation.
In Phase III, the court could then choose statistically significant bellwether
plaintiffs, and divide these bellwether plaintiffs as necessary into groups according
to the different variables.296 This Pha~e III differs from those utilized in Hilao and
Cimino in its application to the non-bellwether plaintiffs' trials. Rather than being
dispositive of the claims of the non-bellwether plaintiffs, Phase III would be
illustrative only. 297 Phase IV would consist oftrials for the remaining plaintiffs. This
phase essentially would result in "mini-trials," proving the individual plaintiffs'
292 See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 100, 117 (E.D. Va. 1980) (justifying class
certification to resolve common issues in a mass tort cases because resolving the issue
against the defendant would likely facilitate settlement); Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied
Maintenance Corp., 442 F. Supp. 1087, 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (explaining the same
principle); Woolley, supra note 148, at 534 ("resolution of [a single] issue may facilitate
settlement").
293 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d 145, 164-65 (2d Cir. 1987) (resolving the
military contractor defense).
114 So long as this issue is separable from proving the issue of liability, they may be tried
separately without violating the Seventh Amendment. See Woolley, supra note 148, at 537-
38. Even if affirmative defenses are "interwoven" with the plaintiffs' claim, common
resolution is possible so long as they are common to the class. See id.
295 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 474 (5th Cir. 1986) (finding no
constitutional impediment in allowing determination of punitive damages before absent
class members prove actual damages); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 593-94
(E.D. La. 1991) (holding that determination of punitive damages before absent class
members prove actual damages does not violate due process).
296 See supra notes 109,113-15 & 156 and accompanying text (discussingthe procedures
used in Hilao and Cimino).
297 See, e.g., A C and S, Inc. v. Godwin, 667 A.2d 116, 119-20 (Md. 1995) (using an
illustrative bellwether plaintiff trial).
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claims.298 In the event that a second jury is used in Phase IV, it would not be
reviewing the findings of fact of thejuries in Phase I or Phase 111.299 Rather, thejury
instructions could indicate that an earlier jury had already determined that: (1)
defendant's actions were sufficient to establish liability, and (2) the product was
capable of causing the specific harms.3"' Thus, plaintiffs would be relieved from
having to reprove, and the defendant prohibited from rearguing, these issues.3"1
Rather, the focus of the trial would be on whether this particular individual's
exposure was sufficient to cause, and did in fact cause, the alleged injuries and the
appropriate measure of damages.30 2 Introduction of the statistical evidence from
Phase III could demonstrate probability,3 3 but such proof would not be sufficient to
establish liability.30 4 A plaintiff would have to present evidence of actual exposure
and medical testimony to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that such
exposure did indeed cause the injury.30 5 A defendant would be limited to introducing
evidence demonstrating how the plaintiff was significantly different from the
bellwether plaintiff, whether plaintiff was exposed, and why such exposure did not
cause plaintiffs injuries.
Although such procedures would admittedly require greater expenditure of
judicial time and resources than the judicial short-cuts employed by Hilao and
Cimino, these measures would streamline the process by resolving as many common
issues as possible, leaving the remaining unique issues for individual trials. 36 More
298 See, e.g., In re Copley Pharm., Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456,469 (D. Wyo. 1995) ("Assuming
the plaintiffs are successful at the class trial and [defendant] is found liable, individual
plaintiffs will then have the burden of proving ... that they were in fact injured by the
Defendant's product.").
299 The right to a jury trial is not jeopardized by the use of a different jury in different
phases. See 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2391 (2d ed. 1994); Woolley, supra note 148, at 543 ("[T]here is no sound
basis for concluding that the convocation of a second jury [even on overlapping issues] will
necessarily lead to violation of the Seventh Amendment."); cf Gasoline Prods. Co. v.
Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499 (1931) (holding that a retrial on the issue of
damages alone does not violate the Seventh Amendment).
300 See supra note 287; see also Faulk et al., supra note 20, at 808 (explaining that if the
trial court properly certifies common issues, rather than individual ones, parties' rights to
due process and to a jury trial are protected).
301 See Faulk et al., supra note 20, at 808.
302 See In re Copley, 161 F.R.D. at 49 ("[A]t the [individual] trials, individual plaintiffs
will present their claims for.., damages [and] these trials will focus on issues of individual
causation .... ).
303 See Gold, supra note 229, at 395-96.
304 See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
305 See supra notes 226-29 and accompanying text (discussing the requisite measure of
proof).
306 See In re Copley, 161 F.R.D. at 469; cf Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2321
(1999) (recognizing that the "great advantage of class action treatment of mass tort cases
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importantly, the use of the individual "mini-trials" would comport with the traditional
notions of due process and the right to a jury trial.3 °7
The Fifth Circuit expressly approved the use of such individual "mini-trials" in
Watson v. Shell Oil Co.3" 8 In Phase I of Watson, the jury was to determine
defendant's liability for compensatory and punitive damages, and in Phase II,
determine the amount of punitive damages. 30 9 "In Phase [III], a differentjury [would]
resolve the issues that are individual to each plaintiff.'' 31 1 Unlike the courts in Hilao
and Cimino, the district court in Shell Oil Refinery recognized that "any number of
plaintiffs less than the entire class could not present the individual claims of [the
entire class]." 31' Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit approved the trial plan and the use
of "mini-trials," finding it consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Constitution.31 2
CONCLUSION
Mass torts undeniably present courts with the problem of balancing procedural
fairness with judicial efficiency.31 3 In the absence of congressional action that
addresses the problem, courts are constrained to resolve mass tort litigation within the
bounds of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and of course, the Constitution. To
the extent that courts craft innovative solutions to address the problems presented by
mass torts, those solutions must remain within the bounds of the traditional notions
of due process and the right to a jury trial. In Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc.,314
the Third Circuit framed the issue as presenting a choice between forging a solution
to a societal problem and preserving institutional values.31 5 Preferably, courts should
attempt to forge a solution to the problems encountered by mass torts, but most
importantly, create solutions that remain true to the fundamental principles of our
jurisprudence 3 6-prese rv ing the right for each party to truly have their "day in court"
is the opportunity to save the enormous costs of piecemeal litigation").
307 See Watson v. Shell Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992); see also In re Copley,
161 F.R.D. at 469 (finding its trial plan consistent with legal precedent).
308 979 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1992).
309 See In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 588, 593-96 (E.D. La. 1991).
310 Id. at 596.
311 Id. at 597.
312 See Watson, 979 F.2d at 1020.
313 See MASS TORT LITIGATION REPORT, supra note 34, at 4.
314 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1990).
311 See id. at 616.
316 See Tidmarsh, supra note 195, at 1804-05 ("[A] court facing a complex case must
choose the most efficient procedure that violates no normative component of
adjudication."); see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard, 119 S. Ct. 2295, 2325 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) ("when 'calls for national legislation' go unanswered.., judges can and should
search aggressively for ways within the framework of existing law ... to avoid a massive
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and the right to ajury trial. The use of statistically significant bellwether plaintiffs,
along with class certification of common issues, represent innovative solutions to
improve judicial efficiency when courts are confronted with mass torts. 317 Such
innovative techniques, if applied too broadly, have the capability of undermining
fundamental jurisprudential principles. In deciding when and in what manner to use
statistical sampling, courts should be mindful of the cautions exhorted by Cato the
Younger more than two-thousand years ago that fundamental principles should be
"circumscribed only by tradition, but never [merely] by men." 318
R. JOSEPH BARTON
denial of justice.").
317 Indeed, many of the members of the Working Group on Mass Torts believed that
"only the subtle exercise of discretion by knowledgeable and creative trial judges has
protected the judicial process from more substantial problems resulting from mass tort
litigation." REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra note 34, at 6.
3 8 FINLEY HOOPER, ROMAN REALITIES 248 (1979) (quoting Cato the Younger during
the crisis of the Catalinian Conspiracy that threatened the overthrow of the Roman Republic
during the consulate of Marcus Tullius Cicero).
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